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Abstract

Losses in the market for private label residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) were at the epicenter
of the financial crisis from 2007-2009. Existing research has shown that a substantial portion of the poor
performance of the loans securitized in this market was caused by fraudulent origination practices, and that
these practices were misrepresented to investors who purchased securities based on these loans. However,
to date no paper has estimated the effects of mortgage fraud on losses from foreclosure in this market. This
paper fills this gap by 1) Accounting for total losses from foreclosure due to no/low documentation loans
which were known colloquially within the industry as Liar's Loans, and 2) Estimating what portion of these
losses can be considered excess from the perspective of the investor. Losses are considered excess in the
sense that they were higher than the expected losses for investors, had the loan quality information disclosed
to them been accurate, instead of fraudulent. I find that Liar's Loans account for roughly 70% of total losses,
and 36% of losses in Liar's Loans can be considered excess. Projected to the level of the entire market, this
implies that $345 billion of the $500 billion in losses from foreclosure are accounted for by Liar's Loans.
Roughly $125 billion, or 25% of total market losses, can be considered excess losses caused by fraud in
Liar's Loans.

1

Introduction

Losses in private label residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) were at the
epicenter of the financial crisis. These losses caused the failure of institutions heavily
invested in them, as well as the failure of institutions like Bear Stearns or AIG that were
invested in complex derivatives based on them such as collateralized debt obligations
or credit default swaps. Existing economic research has shown that a substantial portion
of the defaults in the loans used to collateralize these securities was associated with
fraudulent or negligent origination practices, that fraud was particularly severe in
no/low documentation loans known colloquially within the industry as Liar’s Loans,
and that the quality of these loans was systematically misrepresented to investors that
purchased these securities by all major intermediaries involved in the sales of
1 Assistant
Professor, Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University. Email:
thomas.herndon@lmu.edu. This paper has greatly benefitted from comments from my dissertation
advisors Robert Pollin, Michael Ash, Arindrajit Dube, Gerald Epstein, and Jennifer Taub. Adam Levitin also
provided useful comments. All errors are of course my own. Original version of paper: November 6, 2015.
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mortgages (Mian and Sufi, 2017; Griffin and Maturana, 2016b; Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin, 2015; Garmaise, 2015; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014; Black, 2013; Keys et
al., 2010; Ben-David, 2011). 2 However, as of writing no paper has yet estimated the
effect of fraud on losses from foreclosure in the loans used as collateral for these
securities.
This paper seeks to fill this gap by 1) Accounting for total losses from foreclosure
due Liar’s Loans from 2007-2012, and 2) Estimating what portion of total losses can
be considered excess from the perspective of the investor. Losses on Liar’s Loans are
considered excess if they are greater than the expected losses that would have occurred
if the loan quality information disclosed to investors was accurate, rather than
misrepresented. The main findings in this paper suggest that losses from foreclosure
due to fraud in this market were substantial, prolonged throughout the entire crisis and
Great Recession from 2007-2012, and concentrated in economically fragile geographic
areas. Losses on Liar’s Loans account for roughly 70% of total losses in the data, and
over one-third of Liar’s Loans losses of can be considered excess. Scaled to the level
of the entire market, this implies that no/low documentation loans can account for
approximately $345 billion of the $500 billion in losses in this market, $125 billion of
which can be considered excess. Moreover, 44% of total losses occurred in ZIP codes
with the highest levels of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications.
These areas were particularly poorly suited to bear these losses, and the prolonged
losses to foreclosure in these neighborhoods helps to explain the terrible economic
performance of these areas throughout the Great Recession.
The research design pursued in this paper identifies the causal effects of fraud on
losses from foreclosure by comparing losses on loans in the no/low documentation
treatment group, with losses on loans with identical observable risk measures in the full
documentation control group. Systematically larger losses in the treatment group are
consistent with the causal effects of fraud. The main problem with this research design
discussed in the empirical literature is the presence of fraud in the full documentation
control group, which would cause this comparison to understate true excess losses
caused by fraud (Griffin and Maturana, 2016b; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014). To
address this issue, qualitative information on high fraud originators from lawsuits
regarding the actual loans in the dataset is used to refine the control group by removing
loans originated by these institutions. 3 Regression discontinuity models based on those
in the literature are then used to confirm the presence of fraud in the full documentation
control group, and show that refinement eliminated fraudulent contamination.
In addition to the contribution to the empirical research on fraud, the findings in
this paper are broadly relevant for research on macroprudential financial regulation,
and research on the role of household balance sheets in the financial crisis. The estimate
of excess losses from foreclosure is significant for financial regulation because these
losses have caused numerous lawsuits from investors who claim they were defrauded
by the major financial institutions. Market regulations and contractual obligations that
require the accurate disclosure of asset quality are a necessary condition for the basic
The term fraud is used in this article in the economic sense and should not be seen as having any legal
significance. See page 4 for a full definition.
3 These lawsuits are discussed in section 3.3.
2
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functioning of capital markets. However, this minimum condition was not met on a
widespread basis because all reputable intermediaries involved in the sale of mortgages
were engaged in systematic misrepresentation (Griffin and Maturana, 2016b; Piskorski,
Seru and Witkin, 2015). The basic issue underlying these lawsuits is succinctly
summarized in a recent ruling by District Judge Denise Cote,
“This case is complex from almost any angle, but at its core there is a single, simple question.
Did the defendants accurately describe the home mortgages in the Offering Documents for
the securities they sold that were backed by those mortgages? Following trial, the answer to
that question is clear. The offering documents did not correctly describe the mortgage loans.
The magnitude of falsity, conservatively measured, is enormous.
Given the magnitude of falsity, it is perhaps not surprising that in defending this lawsuit
defendants did not opt to prove that the statements in the Offering Documents were
truthful.” 4 [emphasis added]

To eliminate the problems in this market, financial regulation will likely need to
prioritize increased monitoring of financial institutions, enforcement of penalties for
violations of disclosure rules including criminal prosecution for executives involved in
misrepresentation, increase investor recourse for violations of stated representations,
and limit extreme compensation packages for executives to reduce incentives for
looting (Black, 2013).
The findings are also relevant for historical narratives of the role of household
balance sheets in the financial crisis because losses from foreclosure imply that
household wealth had already been entirely wiped out. In addition to loss of wealth for
the individual homeowner, losses from foreclosure have substantial negative
externalities that cause loss of wealth for everyone in a neighborhood. Research has
shown that the fire sale of homes caused by large numbers of foreclosures during the
financial crisis reduced house prices lower than they otherwise would have fallen, and
can account for roughly one-third of the fall in house prices. The reduction in house
prices further impaired household balance sheets, thereby reducing aggregate demand.
Estimates suggest the causal effects of foreclosures during the crisis were responsible
for roughly one-fifth of the decline in residential investment and auto-sales (Mian, Sufi,
and Trebbi, 2015). Moreover, many of the investors in these securities were
institutional investors such as retirement and pension funds. Therefore losses in these
securities also contributed to loss of household wealth through decreasing retirement
savings.
The prolonged losses from foreclosure due to fraud that were concentrated in
economically fragile areas also help to explain the lack of recovery in these places. The
financial panic had largely subsided by 2009. However losses from foreclosure in
private label RMBS were much more prolonged, and remained at a high level of close
to $100 billion per year from 2010-2012. Fully 44% of the losses from foreclosure from
2008-2012, or roughly $220 billion, occurred in ZIP codes with the highest levels of
4 From ruling in Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, May 11th, 2015. The FHFA
sued 16 trustees for misrepresentations made in offering documents and prospectuses for securities sold
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. All but Nomura and Royal Bank Scotland settled out of court, and the
court ruled against these institutions in trial on May 11th, 2015. Accessed on June 26th, 2015 from:
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2077713/ruling-on-mortgage-fraud-in2008-crisis.pdf
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fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. 5 These ZIP codes were
particularly poorly suited to bear these losses because in the pre-crisis period they had
low average credit scores, low income, high poverty rates, and high unemployment.
Research has shown that these ZIP codes experienced terrible economic performance
throughout the course of the crisis, including negative income growth, increased
poverty, and increased unemployment (Mian and Sufi, 2017).

2

Literature Review

This section will review the basic description of fraud in the private mortgage
securitization supply chain that emerges from the existing research, and describe how
the main results in this paper contribute to this body of literature. Fraud is defined as
deception or misrepresentation with the intent to result in financial or personal gain.
The term fraud is used in this paper in the broader economic sense, rather than the
narrow legal sense. Fraud is used to refer to the economics of deception and trickery,
rather than trades based on mutually beneficial gains. The term as used here should not
be seen as having any legal significance. That being said, much of what occurred in
this market was in fact illegal. These fraudulent practices have led to numerous lawsuits
and Department of Justice settlements, but few prison sentences. Although there is no
direct evidence of intent in the dataset, existing research has shown that the relevant
parties in this market had the information to be adequately aware of misrepresentation,
as well as the incentives to profit from deception (Griffin and Maturana, 2016b).
Therefore fraud is the most accurate term, even if not the most polite, to describe the
practices in this market.
The private label, originate to distribute supply chain consisted of institutions which
originated mortgages and sold these loans to investment banks for distribution. The
investment banks packaged mortgages into securities, obtained ratings from ratings
agencies, and sold the securities to investors. Losses in these securities were at the
epicenter of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. A substantial body of research has now
documented a high incidence of mortgage fraud throughout both the origination and
distribution portions of this supply chain. For example, as early as 2004 the FBI warned
of an epidemic of mortgage fraud which could cause a financial crisis (Black, 2013).
Also, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that a systemic breakdown
in accountability and ethics was an essential cause of the crisis (FCIC, 2011).
At originating institutions, there was a systematic abandonment of underwriting
standards in order to increase the volume of loans originated, with no regards to quality.
Mortgage fraud through the falsification of borrower financial information helped to
increase origination volume through allowing institutions to originate larger loans than
otherwise possible (Taub, 2014; Black, 2013; FCIC, 2011; Hudson, 2010). Empirical
5 The measure of income overstatement used in this paper is similar to that in Mian and Sufi (2017),
with one small difference. Similar to Mian and Sufi (2017) I use HMDA data to construct average borrower
income recorded in mortgage applications at the census tract level, and IRS income data to construct
average income at the ZIP code level. However, I match census tracts to ZIP codes through the free program
developed by the Missouri Data Center as in Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2016), rather than the
proprietary bridging used in Mian and Sufi (2017).
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research has now systematically documented a high incidence of misrepresentation in
securitized loans, which resulted in a higher chance of default (Griffin and Maturana,
2016b; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2015; Garmaise, 2015; Ben-David, 2011; Keys et
al., 2010; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014). For example, (Gri n and Maturana, 2016b)
found that roughly 48% of securitized loans included misrepresentation along just three
easy to measure dimensions, misreported owner occupancy status, unreported second
liens, and appraisal value inflation, and that these loans were 51% more likely to
default.
Liar’s Loans were particularly useful in abetting this behavior because there was
less documentation to falsify. 6 To be sure, no documentation loans were not prohibited,
as long as the stated income and assets were accurate. However, as their colloquial
name indicates, these loans were not used to accurately state borrower financial
information. Indeed, loan officers often coached borrowers to falsely state their
information, or falsified borrower documents without the borrower’s knowledge. 7 As a
result these loans performed particularly poorly, with a 5-8 percentage point higher
default rate than full documentation loans (Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014). 8
The obvious question that emerges is how could abandoning underwriting standards
ever have been in the interest of the originating institution? A common interpretation
is that this was simply the result of risky bets gone wrong. 9 However, this interpretation
is not wholly convincing because it cannot explain the large payouts received by
executive officers of the originating institutions, even when their institutions failed. 10
Indeed, these risky bets paid off quite handsomely for the executive officers, even if
they resulted in ruin for their institutions. In my reading of the literature, the most
convincing interpretation that is able to explain the pattern of extreme executive
compensation, despite the abandonment of underwriting standards resulting in the
bankruptcy of their firms, comes from fraud expert Bill Black, who argues that
executives looted their companies.
Looting occurs when owners or executives have limited liability for a firm, and
maximize short-term pay-outs at the expense of the long run health of their firm,
6
The break room at one Ameriquest/Argent branch was dubbed the Art Room, because it contained all
the tools necessary to falsify documents. For example, sta members would cut out a name from a W2
income tax form with low income, and simply glue it on a W2 form with high income (Hudson, 2010). No
documentation loans streamlined this process because they did not rely on falsifying W2’s.
7 For example, Omar Khan, a loan officer at subprime originator Ameriquest/Argent, stated, Every
closing was a bait and switch, because you could never get them to the table if you were honest. He further
elaborated, “There were instances where the borrower felt uncomfortable about signing the stated income
letter, because they didn’t want to lie, and the stated income letter would be filled out later on by the
processing staff,” [National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association,
2014]. This anecdote is supported by an FBI study, which found that 80% of fraud cases involved collusion
or collaboration with industry insiders based on investigations and fraud reports (FBI, 2007).
8 However, the authors emphasize that this should be seen as a conservative lower bound, because the
identifying assumption is that the full documentation control group is free of fraud.
9 For an example of this interpretation, see the post-mortem analysis of New Century Capital performed
by Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2010), with critical response in Black (2013).
10 These payouts often took the form of bonus compensation that was not required to be paid back if
the institution failed. Compensation estimates for executives at the largest 25 subprime originators has
been compiled by the Center for Public Integrity, and is available at The
https://www.publicintegrity.org/business/finance/whos-behind-financial-meltdown/subprime-25
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resulting in bankruptcy. Looting has been described as bankruptcy for profit (Akerlof
and Romer, 1993). Mortgage fraud helped executives loot their institutions because it
increased short-term revenues that could be extracted. Fraud was particularly useful for
increasing short-term revenues because in addition to allowing institutions to increase
the volume of loans, fraudulent loans tended to have high initial fees attached to them
as well as higher interest rates. Before losses occurred, these fees allowed originators
to report high short-term revenue, and their balance sheets would also look strong due
to the higher interest rates on their assets (Black, 2013). 11 Additionally, originating
institutions could sell riskier loans to be securitized for a higher price than safer loans
(Taub, 2014). That being said, many of the originators still held a large portion of the
toxic loans in their portfolio, and went bankrupt as a result.
The looting interpretation is also significant for macroprudential regulation because
skin in the game rules that require institutions to hold a portion of the mortgages they
originated in their portfolio would not have prevented fraud. These institutions had
substantial skin in the game which caused their failure. However, their executives did
not. Fraud prevention would likely have required increased monitoring of institutions,
limits to extreme compensation packages, and criminal prosecution of top executives
(Black, 2013).
In the distribution portion of the supply chain, this body of research has also shown
that these forms of fraud were systematically concealed from investors who purchased
securities based on these loans. For example, Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) found
that a “significant degree of misrepresentation exists across all reputable intermediaries
involved in the sale of mortgages,” [emphasis in original]. The sale of loans that were
originated with fraudulent practices, or simply negligent underwriting, typically
violated market regulations and contractual obligations. These rules require the
accurate disclosure of loan quality; however, these practices obviously were not
disclosed. 12 All major sellers of private MBS have had numerous lawsuits initiated
against them. 13 Forensic auditing has found that in some cases as high as 99% of the
11 Black (2013) also argues that this pattern of behavior was very similar to the fraud which occurred during
the S&L scandal of the 1980s.
12 The typical offering documents included prospectus supplements which described the quality of
collateral underlying the securities. These documents tended to include boilerplate language similar to,
Wells Fargo Bank’s underwriting standards are applied by or on behalf of the Wells Fargo Bank to evaluate
the applicant’s credit standing and the ability to repay the loan, as well as the value and adequacy of the
mortgaged properties collateral [General Retirement System of the City of Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al,
2009]. If the trustee discovered a breach of these representations and warranties, such as falsification of
borrower financial characteristics, violations of assurances that loans were originated following proper
underwriting standards, or that the appraisal value for the collateral was inflated, the trustee must notify
the appropriate parties and take steps to enforce the responsible parties obligation to cure, substitute, or
repurchase the defective mortgage loans [National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, 2014]. It should be noted that origination practices that could be argued were simply
negligent or dubious, but did not involve outright falsification, were still fraudulent because they violated
the representations made in offering documents.
13 An older list of 58 lawsuits filed from 2008-2012 can be found in the appendix to (Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin, 2015). However, this list is not exhaustive, as the 2009 class action lawsuit used in this paper was
not on the list (General Retirement System of the City of Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al, 2009). In addition,
several similar lawsuits have been filed for violations of the False Claims Act or the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), for actions such as misrepresenting the quality of loans

6

loans in an issuance were in violation of underwriting practices stated in offering
documents. Additionally, once defective loans were detected, RMBS Trustees failed to
protect investor interests through curing defective loans or enforcing loan buy backs.
One court described the problem thus: “to accept that the Trustee was unaware
of...reports and investigations [regarding underwriter and servicer misconduct] would
require the court to find that responsible officers of Defendants had been living under
a rock’ and that [i]f the Trustee was indeed ‘living under a rock,’ it had no right to do
so given it’s role and responsibilities,” (Galdston, Kaplan and Gilmore, 2014).
In contrast to the problems with originating institutions that could reasonably be
described as looting, the problems in the market for securities based on these loans are
more accurately described as a market for lemons. The term lemon refers to a car which
is poor quality, or more generally to any product that is poor quality. A market for
lemons is a market where good and bad quality products are sold, where sellers have
inside information concerning the quality of the products they sell, but where the buyers
cannot know beforehand whether they are buying a good or bad product. In these
markets bad products tend to push out good products because good and bad products
must sell at the same price due to lack of buyer access to inside information. Over the
course of the housing bubble, it is clear that bad practices in this market had pushed
good practices out because these problems were common to all major institutions
involved in the sale of these securities (Akerlof, 1970; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin,
2015).
As of writing, the empirical papers on mortgage fraud have primarily focused on
directly observing the incidence of fraud, and constructing loan level estimates of the
effects of fraud on delinquency. However, we would also expect the concealed leverage
and risk to cause these loans to lose more in foreclosure than non-fraudulent loans.
Ben-David (2011) provides a simple illustration of how fraud concealed increases in
borrower leverage using the example of appraisal inflation in the 2006 sale of a condo
in Chicago. The condo was worth $235,000, but the builder was willing to inflate the
price to $255,000 and return the extra cash to the buyer at the closing table. The buyer
could then use the extra $20,000 as a down payment for a mortgage with a loan-tovalue ratio of just under 95%. However, the true loan-to-value ratio was 100% because
none of the borrower’s own money was actually used for the down payment. 14 Due to
this hidden increase in leverage, the loan would also be expected to lose more in
foreclosure. The findings in this paper contribute to the existing literature by providing
the first estimate of total losses from foreclosure caused by Liar’s Loans, and estimating
what portion of total losses can be considered excess. Additionally, this paper is the
first to use data from the Columbia Collateral File, and so also confirms existing
findings using novel data.
The estimates in this paper are also relevant for research that has shown that the
geographic areas with high levels of fraud performed poorly during the Great
to entities which insured these loans. A list of 31 lawsuits can be found at: http://www.buckleysandler.
com/uploads/1082/doc/Recent-FIRREA-Cases_BuckleySandler-LLP_v20.pdf. Accessed August 12th, 2015.
14 Alternatively, in some cases the buyer walked away with the money, used it to finance remodelings,
or even to buy a new Mini-Cooper sports car in one instance. Also, loan originators often pocketed the
extra money through high origination fees.
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Recession. These estimates of losses from foreclosure provide a quantitative
description of one of the mechanisms that caused this poor performance. For example,
Mian and Sufi (2017) construct a measure of fraudulent income overstatement on
mortgage applications at the ZIP code level. 15 They find that high income
overstatement ZIP codes performed significantly worse with higher default rates,
negative income growth, increased poverty, and increased unemployment.
Additionally, Griffin and Maturana (2016a) find that areas with higher concentrations
of originators who misreported mortgage information experienced a 75% larger relative
increase in house prices from 2003 to 2006, and a 90% larger relative decrease from
2007-2012. The estimates of total and excess losses from foreclosure produced in this
paper are significant for understanding the poor performance of these areas. Research
has shown that foreclosures have large negative externalities which cause unnecessary
destruction of wealth for everyone in a neighborhood. The large number of foreclosures
that occurred during the financial crisis and Great Recession caused homes to be sold
in a fire sale that depressed values for all houses in the neighborhood. The
neighborhood wide reduction in house prices impaired all household balance sheets in
an area, reducing aggregate demand. Research has shown that the causal effects of
foreclosures during the financial crisis and Great Recession were responsible for
roughly one-third of the decline in house prices, one-fifth of the decline in residential
investment, and one-fifth of the decline in auto-sales (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2015).

3

Research Design

The research design section is organized into three parts. The first part presents the data
description, the second presents the identification strategy and regression model, and
the third discusses data-driven refinements for the control group.

3.1

Data Description

The sample of loans used in this study comes from the Columbia Collateral File (CCF).
The CCF is a large loan-level panel dataset that includes all loans used as collateral in
private label RMBS for which Wells Fargo is a trustee. To my knowledge this study is
the first to use this dataset in the context of empirical research on fraud. However, the
sample is compiled from trustee reports so it is most similar to the data used in Griffin
and Maturana (2016b) and Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015). The main advantages of
this data relative to others used in the literature is that this data is publicly available and
contains detailed information on losses from foreclosure. It is not clear if information
on losses from foreclosure is available in the other data sources used in the empirical

15 They construct this measure as the difference in the annualized growth of income reported to the IRS,
and reported on mortgage applications under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). They find that
the housing bubble period from 2002-2005 was unique in that the growth of income on mortgage
applications reported in HMDA data substantially outpaced that reported on IRS documents, while in past
periods the ratio of growth in income was constant. They find that this was driven by fraudulent income
overstatement in the private label RMBS market.
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literature. However, in either case no other paper has directly measured the dollar value
of losses from foreclosure due to fraud.
The data contains monthly observations for 139 variables that include measures
such as loan characteristics and performance. The data begins in December 2006, which
makes 2007 the first year for which complete data is available. In December 2007, the
CCF contained roughly 4.2 million total loans; 2.4 million of these loans, or 58%, were
Liar’s Loans. By 2012 the number of loans in the dataset had fallen to roughly 1.8
million. This is largely due to the 1.5 million completed foreclosures that occurred.
Figure 1 shows the yearly outstanding balance of the entire private label market,
the CCF, and Liar’s Loans in the CCF from 2002-2012. The private label market grew
rapidly from 2002 to 2007, almost tripling in value. After peaking at an outstanding
balance of $2.7 trillion in 2007, the market experienced severe losses and declined
rapidly. The CCF was not a substantial portion of the market until 2005. However, it
grew rapidly to account for just under 40% of market share in 2007 at an outstanding
balance of $1.05 trillion.
Descriptions of fraud suggest that the intensity of fraud increased through time
peaking roughly from 2005-2007. Liar’s Loans have been reported to be particularly
bad in this time period. The growth of the share of Liar’s Loans in the CCF mirrors this
pattern. In 2003 the share was 40% of loans in the CCF. The share grew rapidly to peak
at two-thirds in 2007. The share has remained high at about 60% from 2007-2012
(SIFMA, 2015).
The CCF data from 2007-2012 appears to be broadly representative of the entire
market. In general, the data accounts for a substantial portion of the entire market and
mirrors the growth of the market. Also, the summary statistics of observable risk
measures are similar to those in Griffin and Maturana (2016b) and Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin (2015). The dataset also contains loans originated by roughly 2000 different
institutions. 16
The main risk measures in this dataset are the FICO credit score and the loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio. The LTV ratio is the ratio of the original loan balance to the appraisal
value of the home and is a measure of the amount of leverage for a given mortgage.
The LTV ratio measures the amount of equity in a home which serves as a cushion to
absorb house price declines. The FICO credit score is an index of creditworthiness that
measures the borrower’s chance of default over the next two years. A higher credit
score indicates a less risky borrower. The score is based on the amount of debt a
borrower currently owes, the borrower’s payment history, types of credit in use, the
length of credit history, and new credit.
The sample of loans from this dataset is restricted to all mortgages that are 1st
lien, owner occupied, originated between 2002-2008, with loan-to-value ratios between
70 and 100, FICO credit scores between 300 and 850, balances greater than $30,000,
and for which there are complete data. This restriction is similar to that employed in
Griffin and Maturana (2016b), to make my results comparable to those in the literature.
The pooled sample is built by merging the December data to provide a retrospective
16
There were approximately 7000-8000 entries for originator names in the CCF. However, redundancies
in originator names occur across numerous dimensions such as capitalization, slight variation in name,
spacing, etc. Therefore the actual size of the list is likely closer to 2000 originators.
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Figure 1: Outstanding Balance of Private Label RMBS Market

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007
Year

Total Market Balance
Liar's Loans Balance

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

CCF Balance

Data for outstanding balance of entire private label RMBS market comes from SIFMA.

snap shot of the year. After these restrictions, the final 2007-2012 pooled sample
includes slightly over 7 million loan-year observations. The sample also includes
roughly 700,000 of the 1.5 million unique foreclosures. A large portion of foreclosures
are typically dropped the month after the foreclosure sale is recorded, so dropped
foreclosures are merged back into the December observations.
The ideal dataset for comprehensively estimating the total effects of fraud would be
a loan-level panel set which included measures that recorded whether a loan was
fraudulent or not, what type of fraud, and how intense the fraud was (i.e. whether
income was overstated 5% or 50%). The obvious main disadvantage of data from the
CCF is that it does not directly measure fraud in this manner. Others have been able to
directly measure certain easy to quantify types of fraud by matching loan-level records
with data from other sources such as credit bureau records. However, these data come
from large proprietary datasets which as of writing I do not have access to.
To address the limitation of not being able to directly observe all forms of fraud, I
restrict the analysis to only estimating the effects of fraud on losses from foreclosure in
no/low documentation loans, which can be identified through the variable document
type. Therefore the estimates produced in this paper do not represent exhaustive
estimates of losses due to all forms of fraud, but are limited to only measuring losses
based on lack of documentation. Additionally, addressing this limitation also requires
refinements to the full documentation control group to reduce the incidence of fraud.
These refinements are detailed in the section 3.3.
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3.2

Identification Strategy and Regression Model

Fraudulent loans cause higher expected losses from foreclosure because fraud
misrepresents borrower’s financial information to give them larger loans than they
would otherwise qualify for. My research design identifies the causal effects of fraud
on excess losses from foreclosure by comparing losses for loans in the no/low
documentation treatment group with losses for loans with identical risk measures in a
refined full documentation control group. Higher expected losses in the treatment group
which cannot be explained by observable risk measures are consistent with the causal
effects of fraud.
The use of full documentation loans as a counter-factual for no/low documentation
loans is particularly appropriate because reduced documentation loans were explicitly
represented in offering documents as not being riskier than full documentation loans.
Offering documents specifically stated that loans were only eligible for reduced
documentation if underwriting standards determined them to be low risk. 17 Therefore,
any additional risk by documentation type violates representations made to investors,
and would be considered excess loss. The highly detailed loan-level data allows me to
construct a rich counterfactual control group of full documentation loans which are
identical along every observable risk measure available to investors. These measures
include the FICO score, LTV ratio, loan type/purpose, amount of loan, and origination
year. The ne-grained geographical detail of the data also allows me to use within ZIP
code and default year variation between treatment and control groups to control for
differences in local economic conditions or time-varying spatial heterogeneity. In
addition, I conduct the Oster (2016) robustness test in section 5 to formally assess the
stability of estimated coefficients due to selection on unobservables.
There is one main threat to identification that has been identified in the literature:
the presence of fraud in the full documentation loan control group. Fraudulent
contamination in the control group would cause the estimate of excess losses to
understate the true effects of fraud (Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014). The widespread
incidence of fraud in full documentation loans in this market has also been
independently confirmed by Griffin and Maturana (2016b) and Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin (2015). For example, Griffin and Maturana (2016b) found that roughly half of
full documentation loans contained at least one of three easy to measure types of fraud:
appraisal overstatement, misreported owner occupancy status, or unreported second
17
Offering documents stated that loans received a score based on different risk characteristics, and that
this score which would be used to determine the stringency of underwriting. They stated that only loans
deemed low risk might be eligible for a reduced documentation program, while medium to higher risk
transactions would be subject to more stringent review. For example, offering documents included boiler
plate language such as, “The Mortgage Score is used to determine the type of underwriting process and
which level of underwriter will review the loan file. For transactions which are determined to be low-risk
transactions, based upon the Mortgage Score and other parameters (including the mortgage loan
production source), the lowest underwriting authority is generally required. For moderate and higher risk
transactions, higher level underwriters and a full review of the mortgage file are generally required.
Borrowers who have a satisfactory Mortgage Score (based upon the mortgage loan production source) are
generally subject to streamlined credit review (which relies on the scoring process for various elements of
the underwriting assessments). Such borrowers may also be eligible for a reduced documentation program
and are generally permitted a greater latitude in the application of borrower debt-to-income ratios,”
(National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 2014).
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liens. Therefore, refinements to the control group to remove full documentation loans
with a high probability of fraud are necessary, and will be described in the next section.
I use a simple linear regression model with a binary treatment indicator to estimate
higher than expected losses in the treatment group. The regression model is:
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑧𝑧 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛬𝛬 ∗ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,
where yizt is one of four outcome variables, Di is the binary treatment variable, Xi is a
vector of controls, αz is a set of ZIP code level fixed effects, and γt are loan-year
observation fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code level for all
models. This model is run for the pooled sample of loans; however, the results are
robust to running the model for each year separately.
The four outcome variables I measure are: 1) a binary variable coded 1 for
foreclosed loans, 2) a binary variable coded 1 for delinquent loans, 3) losses from
foreclosure in dollar values, and 4) losses from foreclosure as a share of the original
balance. The measures of foreclosures are based on the variable losses on liquidated
property, which likely includes all home forfeiture actions more broadly, such as short
sales or deeds in lieu. These actions are all substantially similar to foreclosure because
they require loss of the home, and will be considered foreclosures for the purposes of
this paper.
The set of controls includes risk measures, loan type, loan purpose, origination
years, and original balance. The principal risk measures employed are the loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio and FICO score. A set of indicators for low, medium, and high LTVs are
used for the regressions. Low LTVs are those with LTVs of 80 and under, which is the
traditional cut-off for mortgages. High LTVs are those with LTVs of 95 or higher
because this is a common cut-off for inclusion into RMBS pools. LTVs between 80 to
95 are considered medium leverage mortgages.
Indicators are also included for FICO credit scores. The OCC Mortgage Metrics
report defines subprime loans as those with FICO scores less than 620, alt-A loans as
those with FICO scores between 620 and 660, and prime loans as those with FICO
scores above 660. In addition an indicator is also included for FICOs greater than 760,
which is the cut o for the FICO High Achievers list. 18
Indicator variables for loan type and purpose are also included in the regressions as
well. The dataset has two broad types of mortgages: fixed rate and adjustable. Fixed
rate mortgages are typically considered the least risky, while adjustable rate are
considered higher risk. Finally, indicator variables for origination year and observation
year are also included.

3.3

Refinement to the Control Group

I re ne the full documentation control group by removing a set of loans with a higher
probability of containing fraud, which are identified using qualitative information from
lawsuit documents concerning the actual loans in the dataset. These lawsuits describe
in depth the widespread fraudulent practices at several large mortgage originators, and
18
This
definition
comes
from
myfico.com.
Accessed
6-25-2015
from:
http://ficoforums.myfico.com/t5/Understanding-FICO-Scoring/Expanded-quot-FICO-High-Achieversquot-scores-of-760-and-above/td-p/111525.
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I remove full documentation loans from these institutions from the control group. I then
use regression discontinuity models based on those in the empirical literature to confirm
that the loans removed exhibited indicators consistent with fraud, and show that
removing these loans produces a refined control group that is not meaningfully
contaminated by fraud.
The sample of loans used in this article is from the Columbia Collateral File (CCF)
which includes all publicly available collateral files for RMBS for which Wells Fargo
serves as a trustee. In its role as a trustee, Wells Fargo has been sued numerous times
for not protecting investors' interests after defective loans were detected, and I utilize
qualitative information from two of these lawsuit documents. In 2011, Wells Fargo
settled a class action law suit for approximately $125 million with several retirement
funds that sustained large losses on RMBS purchased from Wells Fargo [General
Retirement System of the City of Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al, 2009]. As of time of
writing, Wells Fargo is also being sued by the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA) for severe losses on $2.4 billion in RMBS purchased by five credit unions,
which caused the liquidation of the five institutions [National Credit Union
Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 2014]. While the
study makes use of lawsuit documents which target Wells Fargo, this study should not
be interpreted as singling out Wells Fargo for uniquely poor practices.
These lawsuits provide important qualitative information concerning the high
incidence of fraudulent practices at particular loan originators, through sources such as
interviews with loan officers and underwriters. Widespread fraud at a total of twentyfive institutions is discussed in depth in both lawsuits, and full documentation loans
from these institutions are removed from my control group. 19 Even though the high
fraud originators are only 25 institutions out of a possible list of approximately 2000
institutions, these originators were also some of the larger institutions and originated
approximately half of the loans in the sample with data recorded for originator name.
The choice to remove high fraud loans is also supported by the analysis in Griffin and
Maturana (2016b), which shows that the worst originators misreported at a significantly
higher level than the best. Additionally, there is a large amount of overlap between the
institutions identified in the lawsuit documents and those identified as high fraud
originators in Griffin and Maturana (2016b).
I also validate my choice of refinement by conducting three tests using regression
discontinuity models based on loans heaped at LTV intervals of 5. These models are
based on the finding that a large portion of loans in this market were discontinuously
heaped at LTV intervals of 5 units (75, 80, 85, etc.), which can be seen in Figure 2
below. Griffin and Maturana (2016b) find that appraisal overstatement was higher for
heaped loans, and that loans with appraisal overstatement had a higher rate of default.
They argue that a large portion of this pattern is more consistent with appraiser’s
targeting home valuations given by loan officers, rather than a random pattern of
19 The originators named in the NCUA lawsuit are: Ameriquest/Argent, Bank of America, Countrywide,
Decision One, DLJ, First Franklin, Fremont, GreenPoint, Impac, Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, National
City, New Century, Option One, Paul Financial, RBS/Greenwich Capital, WMC Mortgage Corp; and the
originators named as defendants or named in testimony in the retirement fund lawsuit are: American
Home Mortgage (named in testimony), Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, RBS/Greenwich Capital, UBS, and Wells Fargo.
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mistakes. The tests employed in this section 1) quantify the extent of heaping in the
data, 2) estimate the difference in mean losses between heaped and non-heaped loans,
3) and conduct a sensitivity test using an external measure of fraud. As will be discussed
in detail below, a summary of the findings from these tests is that the high fraud loans
identified in lawsuit documents show substantial indicators of fraud, and thus are
appropriate for removal. Moreover, removing these loans meaningfully reduces all
indictors of fraud, and estimates based on the resulting refined control group are no
longer sensitive to an external measure of fraud. On balance the results from these tests
Figure 2: Historgram of LTV Heaping at Intervals of 5

suggest that the refinement successfully purged any contamination from the control
group that could threaten identification.
The first regression discontinuity model is the McCrary (2008) test, which helps to
diagnose the presence of fraud by measuring the extent of heaping in the data. The test
first divides the data into a rough histogram based on the LTV value, and then smooths
the histogram on either side of the breakpoint being tested. Heaping is measured as the
log difference in the height of the smoothed polynomials fitted on either side of the
breakpoint. The heaping test only allows a single breakpoint to be tested, so the data
are centered on the LTV intervals. The bin size of .1 is used because this is consistent
with how the LTV values are recorded in my data, and I select the default bandwidth.
Results for this test are presented in Table 1 and Figure 3 below.
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The second test is based on the diagnostic suggested by Barreca, Lindo and Waddell
(2016), for assessing whether heaped data would bias results from regression
discontinuity model. This test uses regression to estimate whether the expected loss for
heaped data is systematically different from non-heaped data, which would be
consistent with fraud. I use this test to confirm that the high fraud loans identified in
lawsuit documents are indeed contaminated, and that removing them from the control
group meaningfully reduces the presence of fraud in the refined control group. To
estimate differences in mean losses between heaped and non-heaped data, I use a
regression discontinuity model similar to that in Griffin and Maturana (2016b). The
regression discontinuity model includes an indicator for heaped loans, and controls for
a fourth degree polynomial of LTV. The model is:
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑧𝑧 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑍𝑍0 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 2 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 3 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 4 + 𝛬𝛬𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

where Z0 is an indicator variable for loans at LTV heaps, and the rest of the controls
are the same as those used in the main regressions. The excess loss measured by the
estimated coefficient for Z0 are distinct from the excess loss presented as the main
result. The coefficient for Z0 measures excess loss for loans at the LTV interval
compared to loans within the same documentation type not at the LTV interval, rather
than compared to a fraud-free control group. Therefore, this is a useful tool to measure
the incidence of fraud within a single documentation type, but not across types. Results
for this test are reported in Table 1.
Table 1 presents results for regression estimates of differences in mean loss between
heaped and non-heaped data in columns 1 and 2, while column 3 presents results from
the McCrary test. T-statistics are reported in parentheses for excess loss, while standard
errors are reported in parentheses for the heaping test. The table compares results for
the unrefined full documentation control group, full documentation loans from high
fraud originators, and the refined full documentation control group which removes full
documentation loans from high fraud originators. These groups are also compared for
no/low documentation loans.
There are two basic findings in this table. First, the high fraud full documentation
loans identified in lawsuit documents indeed show the highest amount of indicators
associated with fraud, and removing these loans from the unrefined control group
significantly reduces fraudulent contamination in the control group. For example, the
McCrary tests in Table 1 show that high fraud full documentation loans exhibit more
heaping than unrefined or refined full documentation groups. Indeed, the log difference
in the height of polynomials fitted to either side of the breakpoint was 3.57, which is
similar to the log difference of roughly 3.6 found for all no documentation loan groups.
Additionally, removing these loans from the unrefined full documentation group
reduces heaping from a log difference of 3.47 in the unrefined control group, to 3.29
for the refined full documentation group. This suggests that removing the high fraud
loans from the unrefined control group was appropriate, and meaningfully reduces
contamination. The pattern in the difference in heaping between high fraud, unrefined,
and fully refined full documentation loans can also be seen below in Figure 3. Figure 3
shows that high fraud loans had the highest amount of heaping, while the refined
control group had the least amount of heaping.
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Table 1: Results for Excess Losses and Heaping from Regression Discontinuity
Models Based on LTV Clusters
Excess Negative Outcomes
Loss/Orig Balance
Loss ($)

Heaping
Log Difference

Full Doc
0.00612∗∗∗

1560.2∗∗∗
(24.34)

(.004)

High Fraud

0.00756∗∗∗
(13.46)

1830.6∗∗∗
(11.78)

3.57
(.008)

Refined

0.00400∗∗∗
(7.54)

1238.8∗∗∗
(8.70)

3.29
(.008)

Unrefined

(23.40)

3.47

No Doc

This table presents results from regression discontinuity models based on loan clustering at LTV intervals of 5, by documentation type and
level of refinement. Columns 1 and 2 present results for excess losses, with t-statistics in parentheses. Column 3 presents results from the
McCrary heaping test (log-difference) with standard errors in parentheses. The unrefined group uses all loans within a documentation type.
The high fraud group uses all loans from high fraud originators within a documentation type. The refined group removes all loans from
high fraud originators.

The test for differences in mean loss for loans at heaps presented in Table 1 also
confirms that high fraud full documentation loans are contaminated, and that removing
these loans from the unrefined control group significantly reduces contamination.
Expected loss for high fraud loans at heaps was $1,830 more than non-heaped high
fraud loans, which was larger than the difference of $1,560 for the unrefined full
documentation group. Consistent with the findings from the McCrary (2008) test,
removing the high fraud loans reduces the difference in expected loss to $1,238.8 for
the refined control group. Additionally, the t-statistic for the difference in expected loss
in the refined control group was substantially smaller than those estimated for all other
groups, suggesting that the difference in expected loss was far less consistent than those
for the other groups. Overall, these results confirm that loans from high fraud
originators contaminated the control group, and that removing them meaningfully
reduces contamination.
The second primary finding in Table 1 is that measures consistent with
fraud are found for all no/low documentation groups, including the refined group.
The positive finding for the refined no documentation groups is significant because
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it suggests that it is unlikely that the reduction in fraud indicators for the refined full
documentation control group is spurious. All no documentation groups show
similar amounts of heaping. The difference in expected loss for heaped loans is also
substantially similar for no documentation loans, with high fraud loans showing a
slightly higher difference.
Figure 3: Net Heaping for High Fraud, Unrefined, and Refined Control
Groups

While the above tests showed that removing high fraud loans from control group
reduced all indictors associated with fraud, there are still some weak indicators which
remain in refined group. There is still some positive heaping, although it is substantially
less than for other groups. Additionally, there is still a small difference in expected loss
between heaped and non-heaped data, although this difference was much less than
those estimated for other groups, and much less systematic as indicated by the smaller
t-statistic. To assess if these weak positive indicators would be sufficient to bias my
results, I also employ a final sensitivity test in this section which uses an external
measure of fraud, based on income overstatement at the ZIP code level. To perform
this test, I split my sample into high and low ZIP codes based on the median level of
income overstatement, and test whether the estimated difference in expected loss is
sensitive to being conducted in high and low fraud ZIP codes. To the extent that the
refinements successfully purged contamination from my control group, we would
expect the difference in loss to be relatively insensitive to whether the model is run in
high fraud or low fraud samples. To the extent that fraud remains in the control group,
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we would expect estimates to increase in the high fraud sample, and decrease in the
low fraud sample.
Table 2 presents the results from estimating the difference in expected loss for
heaped and non-heaped loans in high and low income overstatement ZIP codes, with a
t-statistic for this difference in the final column. The primary finding in this table is that
difference in estimates for the unrefined control group in high and low fraud samples
is significantly different, while the difference in estimates for the fully refined group is
not. The difference in expected loss for the unrefined group is $1,800 in the high fraud
ZIP code, and $975 in the low fraud ZIP code. This difference is significant, with a tstatistic of 6.55.
Table 2: Excess Losses at LTV Heaps by ZIP Code Income Overstatement

Unrefined

High Fraud

Low Fraud

t-stat

1799.8∗∗∗

975.1∗∗∗

6.55

1380.6∗∗∗

937.6∗∗∗

1.53

(87.02)

Refined

(91.03)

(190.3)

(219.1)

Standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

In contrast, the estimates from the refined control group show much less variation
between high and low fraud samples, with the difference in estimates not significantly
different from zero. The estimates ranged from $937.6 in the low fraud sample, to
$1,380 in the high fraud sample, but both had large standard errors of roughly $200.
This implies that the t-statistic for the difference in estimates between high and low
fraud samples for the refined group was only 1.53. Moreover, neither estimate is
different by even a single standard error from the effect estimated in the full sample of
ZIP codes. The lack of sensitivity of the results for the refined specification increases
my confidence that the weak positive indicators detected for the refined control group
in Table 1 are not large or systematic enough to bias my main results. Additionally, the
positive finding for the unrefined group also suggests that the null finding for the
refined group is not spurious.
Overall, the weight of evidence from the previous three tests confirms that the high
fraud loans are appropriate for removal, and gives me reasonable confidence that the
final refined control group is not meaningfully contaminated by fraud. The high fraud
loan group showed the largest indicators of fraud from the tests based on McCrary
(2008) and Barreca, Lindo and Waddell (2016). After these loans were removed, the
tests for the final refined control group showed substantially smaller indicators than
other groups, which were much less systematic. A final sensitivity test also showed that
the indicators for the refined group were not systematically different when estimated in
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high and low fraud samples, while those for the unrefined group were. This pattern
suggests that the weak indicators for the refined control which remained in Table 1
were not large or systematic enough to bias my main results.
To further confirm that my main results are not biased, I also perform a final
sensitivity test in the robustness section. This diagnostic tests for whether the main
results are significantly different when I remove heaped loans from the sample.
Barreca, Lindo and Waddell (2016) show that removing heaped loans also removes the
bias induced by them, so comparing results from specifications with and without
heaped loans would reveal the size of any remaining negative bias. As will be discussed
in further detail in the robustness section, removing heaped loans increases the
estimated effects for the refined group by less than one-standard deviation. In contrast,
removing heaped loans for the unrefined group significantly increases estimated
effects. Based on the combined balance of evidence from the tests in this section and
final robustness test, I have reasonable confidence that my refinement successfully
removed any contamination that would bias my main results. However, it is worth
noting for the skeptical reader that to the extent that I was unable to successfully purge
contamination, then my estimates should be seen as a conservative lower bound for the
true effects.
The final table in this section shows the distribution of covariates between the Liar’s
Loans treatment and refined full documentation control groups to check for balance on
observables. Table 3 is divided into three panels. Panel A shows mean loan information
including the original loan balance, LTV and FICO score. Panel B presents the
distribution of risk measures, loan type, and loan purpose between groups. Finally
Panel C presents loan performance information. The basic finding in this table is that
the control group consistently has worse observable risk measures than the treatment
group. To the extent that this selection is not entirely mitigated by the risk controls, we
would expect the estimates in this paper to underestimate the true effects of fraud.
In panel A, we see that the control group has a slightly lower original balance than
the treatment group. This is consistent with the slightly riskier average measures for
the control group. The control group mean FICO score was roughly 30 points lower
than that for the treatment group, while the LTV was 3 percentage points higher. Panel
A also shows the number of loans in the treatment and control group. The refinements
removed a substantial portion of loans from the control group. However, there are still
over 650,000 loan-year observations in the control group, so lack of statistical power
should not be a problem.
Panel B shows the distribution of LTV ratios, FICO scores, loan purpose, and loan
type between these groups. The control group had a significantly larger proportion of
subprime FICO scores than the treatment group, which had roughly 67% of loans with
credit scores prime or higher. The treatment group also had 80% of loans with LTV
ratios 80 or under. This is a high proportion of loans that should have had a large equity
cushion to absorb house price declines of up to 20%. The treatment group also had less
risky loan types and purposes. Cash-out refinances were notoriously abused during the
housing bubble, and the treatment group includes fewer cash-out refinances. The
treatment group does include more adjustable rate mortgages, which were riskier than
fixed rate mortgages. However, on net, the treatment group has substantially better
observable risk measures. Due to the better risk measures in the treatment group, if
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selection bias persists despite the inclusion of controls, we would expect this bias to
understate the true effects of fraud.
The final panel shows loan performance statistics. The poor performance of these
loans is without precedent in recent history. For example, the delinquency rate between
1995-2005 averaged roughly 2%, and peaked at 11% during the crisis. Despite having
better observable risk measures, the treatment group had a delinquency rate almost 7
percentage points higher than the already high delinquency rate of the control group.
This difference alone is almost the entire peak rate for all mortgages during the crisis.
Additionally, the foreclosure rate was roughly 25% higher for the treatment group.
These loans also lost a large amount in foreclosure at close to 60% of the original
balance or $176,000. In contrast, the control group lost slightly less of the original
balance despite having a higher mean LTV.
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Table 3: Sample Description
Panel A: Loan Information (Mean)
Original Balance ($)

Treatment

Control

324,749

277,596

Loan-to-Value

80.9

FICO Score
N

83.3

684.7

653.19

3,695,068

682,088

Panel B: Distribution of Risk Measures, Loan Type, and Purpose (%)
Treatment

Control

FICO Score
Sub-Prime

12.5

35.2

Alt-A

20.4

21.3

Prime

55.2

32.6

High Achiever

11.9

10.9

LTV <= 80

80.3

62.5

80 < LTV <= 95

13.5

23.8

95 <= LTV

6.3

13.7

Fixed Rate

32.7

46.8

Adjustable

67.3

53.3

Purchase

53

39.11

Refinance

13.9

15.8

Cash-out Refinance

33.1

45.1

Loan-to-Value

Loan Type

Loan Purpose

Loan Performance
Treatment

Control

Foreclosure Rate (%)

46.8
10.2

40.4
8.5

Mean Loss in Foreclosure ($)

176315

116304

Loss/Original Balance (%)

57.8

51.1

LTV if Foreclosed (mean)

81.6

84.4

Delinquency Rate (%)
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4

Main Results

Section 4 presents the main results for total and excess losses from foreclosure caused
by fraudulent Liar’s Loans. A preview of the main findings in this section is that total
and excess losses from foreclosure due to fraud were substantial, prolonged, and
concentrated in neighborhoods particularly poorly suited to bear the losses. Losses
from foreclosure for the entire private label RMBS market totaled $500 billion from
2007-2012. About 70%, or $345 billion, of these losses are accounted for by losses in
no/low documentation Liar’s Loans. Of this $345 billion, $125 billion can be
considered excess. This implies that excess losses in Liar’s Loans alone account for
25% of total market losses. Forty-four percent of total market losses occurred in ZIP
codes above the 75th percentile of fraudulent income overstatement. These
neighborhoods were already economically fragile before the financial crisis and
experienced terrible economic performance throughout the Great Recession. The
prolonged foreclosure crisis was a significant factor in explaining this poor
performance.
The results in this section are presented in two tables and one figure. Table 4
presents estimates of excess foreclosures, delinquencies, and loss. Table 5 scales these
estimates to calculate total and excess losses for the entire market. Finally, Figure 4
shows the distribution of losses through time.
Table 4: Main Results: Excess Negative Outcomes for Liar’s Loans in Pooled
Sample
No Controls
Some Controls Preferred
Unrefined
Loss ($)

6546.5∗∗∗

6660.0∗∗∗

6602.5∗∗∗

4290.2∗∗∗

0.0168∗∗∗

0.0179∗∗∗

0.0187∗∗∗

0.0120∗∗∗

0.0176∗∗∗

0.0214∗∗∗

0.0233∗∗∗

0.0175∗∗∗

0.108∗∗∗

0.104∗∗∗

0.0812∗∗∗

4377156

4377156

7018803

(46.14)

Loss/Orig Balance

(39.62)

Foreclosure Rate (%)

(29.48)

Delinquency Rate (%)

0.0671***
(42.68)

N

4377156

(52.30)

(48.01)

(39.65)

(80.50)

(62.56)

(58.75)

(49.42)

(88.20)

(61.04)

(56.69)

(55.51)

(103.13)

Table 4 shows the main results for excess foreclosures, delinquencies, and losses
from Liar’s Loans in the pooled sample. The table presents results from regressions of
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the outcomes on the no/low documentation indicator, with 1) no controls, 2) risk
controls only, 3) all controls, and 4) the unrefined full documentation control group
with all controls. Specifications one to three move from least saturated to most
saturated models, with the most saturated model being the preferred estimate. The
unrefined specification is included to allow us to assess the size of the effects of the
refinements. Specification one regresses each outcome on the treatment indicator, and
only controls for the size of the original balance. Specification 2 also includes sets of
controls for the LTV ratio, FICO score, loan purpose, and loan type. Finally,
specification three also includes ZIP code level fixed effects, indicators for origination
year, and loan-year observation fixed effects.
All specifications in this table show statistically and economically significant
results for all outcomes. The results are also reasonably consistent across specifications.
The preferred estimate in this table shows that the conditional foreclosure rate was
roughly 2.3 percentage points higher than that for the control group. This result implies
that fraud caused a 30% relative increase in foreclosures compared to the control group
foreclosure rate of 7.5%, or equivalently that roughly one-fifth of Liar’s Loans
foreclosures were excess. The excess loss in dollars for the preferred specification was
$6,602.50. However, this average was produced with a foreclosure rate of only 10% in
the treatment group, and so excess loss per foreclosure should be scaled appropriately
to $66,025. Excess loss as a share of the original balance for the preferred specification
were 1.87 percentage points of the original balance, but again should be scaled
appropriately to 18.7 percentage points of the original balance per foreclosure. The
average loss as a share of the original balance for the refined control group was 50%.
This implies that Liar’s Loans lost 35.4% more of the original balance per foreclosure
than the control group average.
Excess foreclosures estimated for the unrefined control group are also consistent
with those estimated for the refined group. The increase in the foreclosure rate for this
specification was 1.75 percentage points, which is similar to that estimated for the
refined model. Excess loss from foreclosure was one-third smaller than those estimated
for the refined specification. The difference in loss suggests that the refinements did
meaningfully reduce the incidence of fraud in the unrefined control group. This also
helps to assess how sensitive the final results are to the refinement employed.
Excess delinquencies were also large and consistently averaged around 10
percentage points across specifications. This increase is quite substantial at roughly
25% greater than the average delinquency rate of 40.4% for the refined control group.
The estimates of excess delinquencies are also within the range of estimates in the
existing research. For example, the unrefined estimate of excess delinquencies was 8
percentage points, which is similar to the 5 - 8 percentage point increase for Liar’s
Loans reported by Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil (2014) that was also based on an
unrefined full documentation control group. Consistent with the expectation that the
unrefined group was contaminated, the fully refined estimate is roughly 25 percent
larger than the unrefined estimate. The delinquency estimate is also similar to those
estimated by Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) and Griffin and Maturana (2016b).
That the results for delinquencies are within the range reported in the existing literature
increases my confidence that the estimates for excess loss are also credible.
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Table 5 shows the estimates of total and excess losses from 2007-2012 scaled to the
level of the entire CCF dataset and entire market. The sample estimates are scaled to
the level of the full CCF dataset using the share of Liar’s Loans losses out of total losses
in the CCF. The results are then scaled to level of the entire market using the CCF
market share. The total number of foreclosures was substantial at 1.5 million in the
Table 5: Total and Excess Losses to Foreclosure for the Entire Private Label
RMBS Market from 2007-2012 (billions $)
Full CCF

Entire Market

Liar’s Loans

1,473,244
890,960

4,091,345
2,474,284

Liar’s Loans Excess

203,523

565,184

Total Foreclosed Balance
All Loans
Liar’s Loans

$321.54
$220.05

$892.95
$611.10

$179.51
$125.06

$498.51
$347.30

$29.99
$46.16

$83.11
$127.91

Total Number of Foreclosures
All Loans

Total Losses to Foreclosure
All Loans
Liar’s Loans
Total Excess Losses
Unrefined
Refined

CCF, and 4 million for the entire market. In comparison, estimates of the total number
of foreclosures for the financial crisis and Great Recession suggest that roughly 5
million foreclosures occurred, and an additional 5 million home forfeiture actions
similar to foreclosures occurred. 20 Therefore, the CCF dataset accounts for roughly
15% of total home forfeiture actions that occurred, and the private label market
accounts for roughly 40%. Of the 4 million foreclosures generated by the privately
securitized market, 2.5 million can be accounted for by Liar’s Loans, and one-fifth of
Liar’s Loans foreclosures can be considered excess.
These foreclosures produced a high level of losses. The total foreclosed balance in
the CCF was $321.5 billion, which implies a total market foreclosed balance of almost
$900 billion. Over half of this foreclosed balance was not recovered through
foreclosure auctions, with losses from foreclosure totaling $500 billion. Losses from
Liar’s Loans accounts for the lion’s share of these losses at $345 billion, or roughly
70% of total losses. A substantial portion of Liar’s Loans losses can be considered
excess. At just over $125 billion, excess losses from Liar’s Loans accounted for over
20

http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/10/foreclosure-crisis-update.html

24

one-third of total Liar’s Loans losses, and one-quarter of total losses for all loans in the
privately securitized market. A substantial portion of these excess losses were caused
by the 565,000 excess foreclosures.
Figure 4 shows the level of total market losses, total Liar’s Loans losses, and excess
Liar’s Loans losses for each year from 2007-2012. This figure is significant
Figure 4: Total and Excess Losses Caused by Liar’s Loans from 2007-2012

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

year
Total Market Loss
Excess Liar's Loans Loss

Total Liar's Loans Loss

because it shows that the bulk of losses from foreclosure were substantially more
prolonged than the financial crisis. The market panic had largely subsided by 2009.
However there were over $125 billion in losses from foreclosure in 2009, and between
$75-100 billion in losses in each year from 2010-2012. These losses were
disproportionately concentrated in geographic areas that were economically fragile
before the crisis, and help to explain the lack of recovery in these areas.
Fully 44% of these losses, or close to $220 billion, occurred in ZIP codes above the
75th percentile of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. Similar
to the findings for the entire market, 70% of total losses in these ZIP codes can be
accounted for by Liar’s Loans. These prolonged losses are significant for the lack of
recovery in these areas because existing research has shown that foreclosures have
substantial negative externalities. Foreclosure sales cause house prices, and thus
wealth, to decline for every home in the neighborhood, which depresses local aggregate
demand. Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2015) find that the causal effects of foreclosures can
account for one-third of the total fall in house prices, one-fifth of the decline in
residential investment, and one-fifth of the decline in auto sales. These effects
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contributed to the terrible performance of high income overstatement ZIP codes. Mian
and Sufi (2017) found that these ZIP codes experienced negative income growth from
2005-2012, as well as increases in poverty and unemployment.

5

Robustness Analysis

Section 5 discusses the robustness of the main results presented in section 4. This
section discusses the robustness of the results to different model specifications,
formally tests for coefficient stability to bias from unobservable confounders using the
analysis developed in Oster (2016), and analyzes to what extent there may be any
contamination left in the control group by comparing the main results to those produced
without heaped loans. Overall, the main results hold up well across different
specifications, are stable to bias due to unobservables, and do not appear to be affected
by a contaminated control group.
The main results presented in section 4 are robust to model specifications with
different geographic levels of fixed effects and different sample restrictions, and across
loan types or purposes. The estimates are robust to including either state or county level
fixed effects, which both produce slightly larger estimates than ZIP code level fixed
effects. To an extent, ZIP code level fixed effects represent a conservative assumption,
because it is known that fraud was clustered by ZIP code. Therefore the fixed effects
may pick up some of the effect that is rightly attributed to the treatment indicator. These
estimates are also consistent when using the unrestricted full sample of all loans from
the CCF. Finally, the estimates are robust across loan types and purposes, with
coefficients similar to those estimated in the preferred sample. In general, fixed rate
loans, refinance, and cash-out refinance loans showed excess loss slightly larger than
those previously estimated, while ARM mortgages and primary purchase loans showed
excess loss that was slightly less.
Table 6: Results from Oster Bias Adjustment for Fully Refined Estimates
Loss ($)
Adjusted Coefficient

6622

Loss/Original Balance
.0194

Foreclosure (%)

Delinquency (%)

.0251

.1154

While the visual comparison of the estimates produced by differing levels of
controls in Table 3 suggest that the estimates are reasonably stable, it is still useful to
formally test for coefficient stability using the method developed in Oster (2016). This
analysis formally tests for the stability of coefficients to bias due to unobservable
confounders by comparing co-movements in coefficients and R2 in models which
include and exclude controls. The bias adjusted coefficients are defined as:
2
2
− 𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − (𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ) 2
2
𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

2
where β is the bias adjusted beta, 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 and 𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
are the coefficient and
2
2
are the coefficient
R from the regression which includes controls, 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
2
2
and R from the regression without controls, and 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the maximum R2. The short
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regressions correspond to the no control model specification in Table 3, while the long
regressions correspond to the preferred specification. The test is performed under the
assumption of equal selection, which assumes unobservables are equally as important
2
2
of 1.3*𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
. As
as observables. Additionally, the test uses the recommended 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
2
described in Oster (2016), this assumption for 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is conservative because only 90%
of true results estimated remain non-zero when using this threshold.
This test shows that the estimates are stable and that any bias due to unobservables
is slight. All bias adjusted coefficients are quite close to non-adjusted coefficients, with
many slightly larger than unadjusted coefficients. For example, the estimate of excess
loss from foreclosure is slightly increased by $20 to $6,622, and the adjusted
foreclosure rate is only two-tenths of one percentage point higher. Overall, this test
suggests that even if we make the strong assumption that unobservables are equally as
important as observables, any bias due to unobservables is slight.
Table 7: Main Results for Excess Negative Outcomes in Pooled Sample

Unrefined

Original

Restricted

t-stat

4290.2∗∗∗

5293.4∗∗∗

8.53

6602.5∗∗∗

6732.9∗∗∗

.74

(70.28)

Preferred

(105.5)

(94.34)

(141.5)

Standard errors in parentheses
∗p

< 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

The final table in this section seeks to quantify any possible bias that remains from
contamination in the control group. Barreca, Lindo and Waddell (2016) use constructed
data to show that heaping induced bias in regression discontinuity models can be
prevented by simply removing heaped data. I use this insight to conduct a final
sensitivity test by comparing estimates of excess loss with and without heaped loans in
the control group. To the extent that contamination in the control group was not
successfully purged, we would expect estimates with heaped loans removed to be
significantly larger than those without heaped loans removed. To the extent that fraud
was successfully purged, we would not expect estimates with and without heaped loans
to be significantly different.
Table 7 presents results from estimates with and without heaped loans removed
from the full documentation control group, and a t-statistic for the difference in
estimates. This test is conducted for both the unrefined and preferred specifications for
better comparability. The basic pattern in this table is that removing heaped loans from
the control group significantly increases the unrefined estimate, but does not
significantly affect the preferred estimate, which is consistent with fraudulent
contamination being successfully purged through refinement. Removing heaped loans
from the unrefined control group produces a large increase in the estimate of almost
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25%. This increase is highly significant as well, with a t-statistic of 8.5. In contrast,
removing heaped loans from the refined control group only increases the estimate by
$70. Scaled to the level of the entire market, this would only increase total excess loss
from $128 billion to $130 billion. This increase is also less than a single standard
deviation, and with a t-statistic of only .74, is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
This suggests that if any contamination remained post-refinement, it would be too slight
to systematically affect my results. Moreover, the large positive increases for the
unrefined group suggest that the null finding for the refined group is not spurious.
Overall, the balance of evidence from this sensitivity test, as well as the tests in section
3, gives me reasonable confidence that the refinement successfully purged fraud from
the control group.

6

Conclusion

The findings in this paper and the broader research on fraud have shown deeply rooted
problems with deception in the structure of financial intermediation. Accurate
disclosure of the quality of collateral backing securities is a minimum condition for the
basic functioning of asset markets. However, this condition was not met on a
widespread basis, with disastrous consequences. The problems with deception led to
historic loss of wealth for savers who invested their retirement funds bogus securities,
for borrowers who were given mortgages that were counter to their best interests, and
for the communities which experienced the prolonged foreclosure crisis. Losses in
no/low documentation Liar’s Loans account for 70% of total losses from foreclosure in
the data. The estimates in this paper suggest that $125 billion, or over one-third of total
Liar’s Loans losses, can be considered excess. Moreover, 44% of total losses occurred
in ZIP codes with the highest levels of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage
applications. These areas were particularly poorly suited to bear these losses, and the
prolonged losses from foreclosure in these neighborhoods helps to explain the terrible
economic performance of these areas throughout the Great Recession.
Borrowers and savers lacked sufficient protections against fraud in part because, at
the time, the dominant view was that these protections were unnecessary. It was argued
that in a free market a financial institution’s interest in maintaining their reputation
would be sufficient to prevent dishonest activities on a large scale. Moreover, complex
financial innovations were seen as efficiency enhancing because they allowed prices to
more fully reflect new information about fundamentals. A sad irony of the financial
crisis is that at precisely the time that these arguments were being made, all of the major
financial institutions involved in the sale of mortgages were falsifying and
misrepresenting the information needed to accurately price these innovations. Instead
of reputation providing incentives for honest dealing, the reputation of the major
financial institutions was used to support the deception by making investors less
suspicious of the securities they purchased (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015).
In light of the widespread problems revealed by the financial crisis, the dominant
pre-crisis view of the impossibility of dishonest practices should be seen as naive, and
now discredited. To address these problems will require the creation of new protections
for borrowers and savers, as well as more aggressive enforcement of existing
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protections. Moreover, financial regulation needs to prioritize increased monitoring of
financial institutions, limit extreme executive compensation, and criminally prosecute
senior executives engaged in deception and fraud.
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